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At a time when so many different religious fundamentalisms are coming
to the foreground and demanding legal recognition, I want to vindicate
something I have come to call feminist fundamentalism, by which I mean
an uncompromising commitment to the equality of the sexes as intense and
at least as worthy of respect as, for example, a religiously or culturally
based commitment to female subordination or fixed sex roles. As I shall
argue, both individuals and nation states can have feminist fundamentalist
commitments.
I. FUNDAMENTALISM AND PERFECTIONISM DEFINED
I define myself as a feminist fundamentalist. I am deeply and
profoundly committed to the equality of the sexes and in particular to its
instantiation in the repudiation of “fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females.”1 These commitments are at my fundament,
my root, my base. My commitment to them is such that I would find it
very difficult to act in ways contrary to or inconsistent with them, much
like a believer who, even when the alternative is martyrdom, would refuse
to deny the faith and sacrifice to what s/he believes are false idols; or, less
dramatically, like a believer who would rather go hungry than eat forbidden
food. A few examples may make this clear: first, recall that the Southern
Baptists fairly recently declared that it was a wife’s duty to “submit herself
graciously to the servant leadership of her husband.”2 Nothing would
induce me to submit, graciously or otherwise, to the leadership of my
husband, and to avoid doing so I will avoid acquiring a husband if
necessary. There is also nothing that would induce me to veil in the way
that many Muslim women willingly do: as a pre-condition for appearing in
public or in the presence of unrelated adult males.3 My refusal to veil has
consequences for, among other things, my freedom of movement. One
1. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (holding
unconstitutional the exclusion of male students from a state sponsored nursing school).
2. See REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON BAPTIST FAITH AND MESSAGE (June 9, 1998)
http://www.utm.edu/martinarea/fbc/bfm/1963-1998/report1998.html (amending the
Baptist Faith and Message so as to make clear that among the “generally held beliefs of
Southern Baptists concerning family” was the concept that “[a] wife is to submit
herself graciously to the servant leadership of her husband even as the church willingly
submits to the headship of Christ”).
3. While I would reject veiling as a condition of entering a country, such as Iran,
or of entering the presence of an unrelated male, I would accept veiling as a condition
of entering, for example, a mosque.
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consequence is that, unless there is profound regime change, I will not be in
a position to travel freely in much of the Middle East. For example, I
cannot so much as enter Iran, because I will not veil.
Of course, many who would also identify themselves as feminists would
not share my difficulties. Indeed, for some Muslim feminists the very act
of veiling is itself a manifestation of their feminist commitments. Like the
religious commitments to which I am pressing an analogy, feminist
commitments can vary in content as well as in character. Feminists, like
those within a faith tradition, diverge somewhat in their beliefs and in their
views of what their beliefs require of them. Moreover, many committed
feminists, like many devout religious believers, would neither embrace nor
be accurately described by the term fundamentalist. I am using the word
fundamentalism here in ways I will seek to define which have a family
resemblance, but not perfect identity, with the way the term is used by
others or in other contexts. I am also seeking to maintain a distinction here
between fundamentalism and perfectionism, another term others may use in
somewhat different ways. I may not be clear about the edges of this
distinction, but I think of myself as a fundamentalist feminist and not as a
perfectionist feminist. If I were less of a fundamentalist when it comes to
veiling, I might be more willing to accommodate by covering my head on
occasion. If I were more of a perfectionist with respect to veiling, I might
favor the position that no one, not even women who are freely willing to
declare their religious commitments or even their subordination by
covering their heads, should be allowed to veil.
For me, the hallmark of fundamentalism is an unwillingness to
compromise and that of perfectionism is a willingness to impose on others.
Another way of formulating the distinction is that perfectionism speaks in
the second or third person—it is about what “you” or “they” should or must
do, not just about what “I” or “We” (as in “We, the people of the United
States”) must do. It is possible, I think, to be both fundamentalist and
perfectionist, neither perfectionist nor fundamentalist, fundamentalist
without being perfectionist, or perfectionist but not fundamentalist. With
respect to any commitment or set of commitments, people can decide they
will not compromise without wishing to impose or can decide they wish to
impose and, perhaps in the interests of that imposition, compromise.
Consider, for example, a vegan invited to a meal at which the host serves
paella, a rice dish made with meat and shellfish. The host’s proposed
solution is that the vegan guest can just scoop out the pieces of meat and
shellfish from the dish. A fundamentalist vegan is someone for whom just
scooping them out is not an acceptable option. Some fundamentalist
vegans are perfectly comfortable sitting down to a meal at which others are
eating meat, so long as their own portion is completely untainted. But one
who is also a perfectionist might insist that only vegan food be served to
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everyone at the table. And one with perfectionist, but not fundamentalist,
tendencies might consider it an acceptable compromise if everyone’s
portion of rice were flavored with shellfish stock, but no other meat or fish
were included in the meal.
Illustrations of the distinction I am drawing between perfectionism and
fundamentalism can be found in ongoing debates concerning, for example,
civil marriage, veiling and sex segregation, abortion, and the teaching of
values in public schools. Note that, perhaps not so coincidentally, in each
of these examples, there are not only feminist perfectionist and feminist
fundamentalist positions, but also religious perfectionist and religious
fundamentalist positions.4 This, of course, does not exhaust the range over
which fundamentalism and perfectionism can apply, even to these debates.
In the same-sex marriage debates, for example, there are gay, lesbian, and
queer fundamentalist and perfectionist positions. It is worth asking more
generally what possibilities for non-religious fundamentalist positions other
than feminist ones there are. I am fairly confident that the framework I am
setting out here can fruitfully be applied to pacifism and to animal rights
and that there is a fruitful connection to what is more often called “freedom
of conscience.”
In much the same way as the various feminist positions I describe are not
necessarily anti-religious or even non-religious (in the sense that these
positions can also be defended by religious arguments), many religious
fundamentalist and perfectionist positions are not necessarily anti-feminist
or non-feminist. At least for the purposes of this paper, I want readily to
concede that, notwithstanding that they are quite inconsistent with some of
my own feminist commitments, veiling, sex-segregated public spaces, sexrole differentiated marriage, and bans on abortion can not only be
reconciled with some other people’s feminist commitments, they can also
be endorsed as feminist and defended with feminist arguments by them.
My own unwillingness to compromise gives me something in common
with Muslim women who have become embroiled in litigation because
they refused to remove their veils, such as Fereshta Ludin and Shabina
Begum, whose cases went to the German Constitutional Court and the
British House of Lords, respectively.5 In each case, these women were
4. See generally Mary Anne Case, Perfectionism and Fundamentalism in the
Application of the German Abortion Laws, in CONTINUING EQUALITY 93 (Martha
Fineman ed., 2009) (discussing feminist fundamentalist, Catholic perfectionist, and
Catholic fundamentalist approaches to the German abortion compromise).
5. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept.
24, 2003, 2 BvR 1436/02 [hereinafter Ludin] (holding unconstitutional, in the absence
of a statute of general applicability, a case by case determination by administrators that
a public school teacher could not wear hijab in class; R (Begum) v. Headteacher and
Governors of Denbigh High Sch., [2006] UKHL 15 [hereinafter Begum] (appeal taken
from Eng.) (upholding the school’s decision to prohibit student’s wearing a jilbab while
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offered a compromise they refused. Ludin, who taught grade school,
acknowledged that she did not believe herself required to veil in front of
her young pupils, but refused the compromise of removing her veil for only
the time she was in class, because of the off-chance an adult male might
enter the classroom.6 It was this unwillingness to compromise that the
local school system claimed made her “unsuitable” as a teacher.7 Begum’s
school offered pupils the possibility of veiling and wearing modest dress
approved of by most Muslims, but she insisted that, after puberty, nothing
less than a more extreme bodily covering, the jilbab, would suffice for her
to meet the Islamic requirement of hijab, or modest covering of women’s
bodies.8 In the House of Lords, Lord Hoffman rebuked her because she
“sought a confrontation” and thereby failed to acknowledge the extent to
which “[c]ommon civility also has a place in the religious life.”9 Hoffman
stressed the “expectation of accommodation, compromise, and, if
necessary, sacrifice in the manifestation of religious beliefs” he saw in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.10 It may therefore
be worth reflecting on the extent to which compromise itself could be a
particular fundamental local value of both the German and the British
constitutional order, such that there could be, somewhat paradoxically, an
uncompromising commitment to compromise. Central to my argument on
behalf of feminist fundamentalism is that asking women like me, or like
United States Air Force Colonel Martha McSally, whose litigation against
the United States military’s requirement that she don hijab while in Saudi
Arabia I will discuss below, to veil, given our particular feminist
fundamentalist commitments, should be seen as in pari materia with asking
devout Muslim women not to veil. It seems to me that too little attention
has been paid in the discourse around these matters to two things. First,
there is a vast literature on the duties of the liberal state to accommodate
the religiously fundamentalist individual. But there is, as far as I can tell, at
least in languages I know, very little discussion about the religiously
fundamentalist state’s duty to accommodate the liberal individual.
Secondly there is some, but not nearly enough, attention paid to the fact
that liberal states can and do have commitments including fundamental and
indeed fundamentalist commitments.

providing students a uniform hijab option).
6. Ludin, supra note 5.
7. See id.
8. See Begum, supra note 5, ¶ 25.
9. See id. ¶ 50.
10. See id. ¶ 54.
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II. SEX EQUALITY IS A PARTICULAR AS WELL AS A UNIVERSAL VALUE
One of my chief purposes in pursuing a feminist fundamentalist project
is to disrupt the oft-perceived dichotomy between feminist or liberal
universalism on the one hand and local cultural commitments on the other
by insisting that we in the liberal, feminist, constitutional West have our
localized, cultural commitments, too, which are at least as important to us,
as worthy of respect, and as entitled to protection, as the local cultural
commitments of others are to them. In seeking to dissolve this dichotomy,
I only wish to bracket for the purposes of this paper—not to deny,
disparage, or obviate—universal human rights claims. The fact that some
of the norms of Western constitutional cultures are required by, and others
are at least consistent with, universal human rights norms is an independent
justification for demanding respect for our norms quite apart from their
cultural significance to us; just as the fact that some other cultural norms
violate or are in tension with universal human rights norms is a basis for
denying such norms respect, notwithstanding their cultural significance.
My claim in this paper is simply that in addition to whatever force our
norms derive from their consistency with universal rights norms, they can
also derive additional independent force from the fact of their imbededness
in or centrality to our particular culture.
The fundamental commitments of the United States and of the other
Western constitutional democracies I have studied as a comparativist
include equality and freedom with respect to sex and gender. The cultures
produced by these commitments are at least as extraordinary, fragile and in
need of defense as cultures more generally recognized as unique and
endangered, such as those of, say, the hunter-gatherers of Papua New
Guinea. Very few cultures over the history or territorial expanse of the
world have embraced commitments to sex equality, the integration of the
sexes and freedom from enforced sex roles and they remain at risk.
Although widely shared in the liberal constitutional West, these and
related commitments can be spelled out in importantly different ways by
different constitutional cultures, just as a shared commitment to the
principles of Christianity or to Islam can work itself out in importantly
different ways among different denominations or communities of believers.
Thus, for example, a feminist fundamentalist perspective on the French
legal system would have to take account of both parité and mixité, as well
as the interaction of these specifically French feminist commitments with
other fundamental French values. As French President Nicolas Sarkozy
said, “The meaning, the values, of French ‘identity’ is clear. It means
laicity, sexual equality, opportunity. I believe in a mix, not in
communitarianism, and, when you forget those national values,
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communitarianism is what you get.”11 That the French mix is somewhat
different from the American, or, for that matter, the Dutch, the British, the
Canadian, or the German, leads France, famously, to answer the question of
whether Muslim girls may wear hijab in public school classrooms
differently than these other nations have, although each of these nations,
like France, is also committed to the equality of the sexes.
The diversity of responses among the signatories to the European
Charter of Human Rights, all of whom share fundamental commitments to
sex equality and freedom of religion, to the question of hijab by Muslim
teachers and students in state-sponsored schools is a useful illustration of
how common and widely shared fundamental commitments can work
themselves out differently among different constitutional cultures, just as
among different denominations within a faith tradition. (One of my
difficulties with the litigated cases generated by these diverse responses to
hijab in schools is that the local cultural norms that received the
overwhelming bulk of judicial attention in them were those pertaining to
religious neutrality rather than sex equality, but that does not affect the
usefulness of the example as an illustration.) In France, a ban on the
wearing of headscarves by pupils in public schools was driven by the
French fundamentalist commitment to laïcité, which, contingently and
fortuitously, happened to have been worked out historically in opposition to
Catholicism and not originally in opposition to the display of Muslim
particularity.12
A similar longstanding fundamental constitutional
commitment to secularism led to a similar ban in Turkey, which was
upheld by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as being within
Turkey’s margin of appreciation.13 But the petitioner in the Turkish case,
11. Jane Kramer, Round One: The Battle for France, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 23,
2007, at 30.
12. See, e.g., Patrick Weil, Why the French Laïcité is Liberal, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
2700, 2704 (2009). The French situation is a complicated one and, for feminists, a
potentially historically problematic one, because laïcité rests on the French
revolutionary repudiation of communitarianism in favor of a commitment to atomized,
indistinguishable individuals, and from the time of the 1789 Revolution to the present
and the parité debate, women in France have tended to be excluded from the
commitment to neutral, fungible individuals. But that is for the French to work out,
although my own feminist fundamentalist commitments lead me to wish that the
French would work it out by integrating women more rather than by abandoning the
initial commitment. For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, “La Révolution n’a
rien fait pour les pauvres femmes”: The Rhetoric and Reality of Political Rights for
Women in the French Revolution (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
13. See Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (upholding Turkey’s ban on
wearing hijab in public universities). The ECHR’s decision did not end controversy
over hijab in Turkey. See, e.g., Beyond the Veil, THE ECONOMIST, June 12, 2008,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/11541234?story_id=E1_TTVQTNPQ
(reporting that the Turkish legislature, prompted by the Prime Minister’s Islamist party,
legislatively authorized headscarf wearing by university students; but on June 5, 2008
the Turkish Constitutional Court overturned the legislation as unconstitutional).
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Leyla Şahin, completed her education, still veiled, in a university in
Austria, which has no comparable commitment to secularism. More
recently, as discussed above, the British House of Lords, invoking, not
secularism, but the British value of reasonable compromise, sided with the
governors of a state school, who were prepared to allow their pupils, the
overwhelming majority of whom were Muslim, to wear a uniform veil, but
not the more all-encompassing jilbab.14 The ECHR had previously upheld
the prohibition on veiling by a teacher in a Swiss public school, accepting
the Swiss court’s determination, inter alia, that the Koranic precept
mandating veiling was “hard to square with the principle of gender
equality.”15 In Germany, controversies about veiling in schools also
centered on teachers, not students: the German Federal Constitutional
Court ruling that allowed the German states some leeway in regulating the
wearing of the veil by public school teachers and other representatives of
the state16 generated an ongoing debate in the federal and local German
parliaments concerning the desirability of banning the veil by
schoolteachers in state-sponsored schools because of the message they, as
agents and representatives of the state, may send to their pupils, with
feminist arguments on all sides.
III. WHAT’S CITIZENSHIP GOT TO DO WITH IT?
It has become increasingly fashionable for scholars to describe any and
all questions of sex equality as dimensions of women’s equal citizenship.
A connection to citizenship comes particularly readily to mind when the
issue is one related to education in public schools, as it is in the European
cases involving the veiling of teachers and students.17 After all, as the
European Court of Human Rights acknowledged in upholding the German
Federal Constitutional Court’s approval of a ban on home schooling by
Christian parents who objected, inter alia, to sex education in schools, a
central function of public schools is “the education of responsible citizens
to participate in a democratic and pluralistic society.”18 For this reason, the
United States Supreme Court held it permissible for public schools in

14.
15.
16.
17.

See Begum, supra note 5, ¶ 64.
Dahlab v. Switz., 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447 (2001).
See Ludin, supra note 5.
The United States also has cases involving bans on veiling by teachers, which,
perhaps to the surprise of some U.S. commentators on the European bans, uphold such
bans, focusing on the obligation of religious neutrality in public schools and often
relying on earlier restrictions on the wearing of habits by Catholic nuns in public
schools. See, e.g., Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist., 723 P.2d 298, 313 (Or. 1986), appeal
dismissed, 480 U.S. 942 (1987) (upholding as applied to Muslim teacher’s headscarf a
ban dating from 1895 on public school teacher’s wearing religious garb).
18. See Konrad v. Germany, 35504/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006).
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Massachusetts to require that those who taught in them be United States
citizens.19
In Turkey, a majority Muslim country with an entrenched constitutional
commitment to Ataturk’s secularism, Şahin’s attempt to attend university
classes wearing a headscarf was rebuffed in part through reliance on a
constitutional provision explicitly framed in terms of citizenship: according
to the Turkish Constitution’s Article 42, “Citizens are not absolved from
the duty to remain loyal to the Constitution by freedom of instruction and
teaching.”20 More generally, in European countries where Muslims are in
the minority, whether a woman wearing hijab can study or teach in a public
institution will understandably be seen to implicate the question of her
acceptance as a full citizen on grounds of both religion and sex. Similarly,
as advocates for gay rights so often remind us, access to both marriage and
the military, the feminist fundamentalist implications of which I will
discuss below, have historically been seen as markers of full citizenship.
I want, however, to offer some resistance to the reflexive tendency to
speak simply in terms of citizenship when such matters are at issue. It is
important to remember that non-citizens, too, in the United States and
elsewhere, have the opportunity, indeed often the right, to engage in
activities I analyze herein in connection with feminist fundamentalism—for
example, to enroll in public schools,21 to marry, to adopt and raise children,
to enter the civil service,22 even to enlist in the military. Liberty and the
equal protection of the laws are guaranteed by the text of the U.S.
Constitution’s Amendments V and XIV to all “person[s],” not only to
citizens.23 In other nations as well, individuals who demand legal respect
for their individual feminist fundamentalist commitments are not limited to
making such demands only in their capacity as citizens or only of the
nations in which they are citizens. And any constitutional culture in which
feminist fundamentalism is entrenched applies its protections and its
strictures to more than simply its citizens.
Where I see questions of feminist fundamentalism and of citizenship in
19. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979) (“Within the public school
system, teachers play a critical part in developing students’ attitude toward government
and understanding of the role of citizens in our society.”).
20. TURK. CONST. art. 42.
21. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding unconstitutional the
denial of public education to illegal alien children).
22. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (striking down a
categorical state ban on aliens in civil service).
23. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. But see, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992) (critically examining the
Supreme Court’s historic turn away from Amendment XIV’s textual guarantee of the
“privileges or immunities of citizens” toward the equal protection clause as a source of
constitutional rights).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011

9

CASE 1/14/11

4/6/2011 7:27:45 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 5

558

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 19:2

the strict sense most clearly intersecting is in the immigration and
naturalization decisions made by nation states committed to feminist
fundamentalism, by which I mean those for whom the equality of the sexes
is a core constitutional value. One of the most prominent recent such cases
involves, yet again, a veiled Muslim woman in Europe. Born in Morocco,
Faisa Silmi moved to France eight years ago upon her marriage to a French
national of Moroccan descent, with whom she subsequently had three
children.24 Wanting, she said, to have the same nationality as her husband
and children, Silmi applied for French citizenship, but, despite her fluency
in the French language and her continued legal residency in France, she
was turned down on grounds of “insufficient assimilation” in a decision
that was ultimately affirmed in July 2008 by France’s highest
administrative court, the Conseil D’Etat.25
Press reports of the decision against Silmi focused on the fact that, since
arriving in France, Silmi had, at her husband’s request, habitually worn a
niqab, or face veil, as part of a very strict form of hijab associated more
with the Arabian peninsula than with Morocco.26 But the record does not
support her claim to the press that she had been excluded from citizenship
“simply because of what [she] choose[s] to wear.” 27 Nor does it support
her lawyers’ attempt to frame her rejection as based on the threat her
religious practices were seen to present to the French value of laïcité.
Rather, the record highlights “in particular the equality of the sexes” as one
of “the essential values of the French community” she had failed to “make
her own.” 28 And the record goes far beyond her veil to describe her as
“living in total submission to the men of her family, which is manifest, not
only in her clothing, but in the whole of her daily life” as well as in the
statements she made to officials indicating that she finds such submission
“normal and that the very idea of challenging this submission never even
crossed her mind.”29 As to laïcité, the official report indicates that Silmi
“spontaneously admitted [to government authorities] that she had no idea
whatsoever about laïcité or about the right to vote.”
According to the New York Times, the “ruling on Ms. Silmi has
received almost unequivocal support across the [French] political spectrum,
including among many Muslims.”30 Among the supporters was Minister
24. See generally Conseil d’Etat [CE] [highest administrative court], June 27,
2008, Rec. Lebon 2008, Section du Contentieux, 286789 [hereinafter Silmi].
25. Id.
26. See Karen Bennhold, A Veil Closes France’s Door to Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES,
July 19, 2008, at A1.
27. See generally Silmi, supra note 24.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Bennhold, supra note 26, at A1.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss2/5

10

CASE 1/14/11

4/6/2011 7:27:45 PM

Case: Feminist Fumdamentalism as an Individual and Constitutional Commi

2011]

FEMINIST FUNDAMENTALISM

559

for Urban Affairs Fedela Amara, a practicing Muslim of Algerian descent
and a founder of the movement Ni Putes, Ni Soumises (“Neither Whores,
Nor Doormats”) which works to improve the treatment of Muslim women
in France by, among others, the men in their own community.31 According
to Amara, Silmi’s niqab, which Silmi herself had told authorities she wore
“more out of custom than religious conviction” was “not a religious
insignia but the insignia of a totalitarian political project that promotes
inequality between the sexes and is totally lacking in democracy.”32
While I might not go so far in my condemnation of the niqab, I am in full
support of the general approach France took toward the question of Silmi’s
citizenship application. In my view, a liberal culture should be at least as
free as a traditional one to defend and preserve its fundamental values by
denying an application for citizenship from someone who has not “ma[d]e
[his or] her own” those fundamental values.33 Answering the many
objections that can be raised to this view would far exceed the scope of this
paper, but I will at least acknowledge a few of them. First, I acknowledge
it to be unfortunate that, just as women who are visibly pregnant have
historically been more readily subject to policing of sexual prohibitions
than the men who got them pregnant, a woman like Silmi, who veils, is
more readily made the target of objections to the gender norms her veiling
can be seen to embody than are the men who may have imposed that
veiling on her or at the very least share her views as to its desirability. Of
course, every effort should be made to examine the citizenship applications
of men, no less than of women, veiled or not, to determine the extent to
which they have adopted values such as sex equality as their own. In
Silmi’s case, her husband already had French citizenship, which only leads
to a series of further objections. Yes, I must acknowledge that there are
already French citizens who have not internalized their nation’s
commitment to sex equality, but this does not seem to me a reason for
France to exercise its discretion to increase their number. To the contrary,
precisely because citizens have the right to shape and change their nation’s
fundamental commitments, nations are entitled to be cautious about those
to whom they extend this right, especially nations like France, that would
have far more contenders for residence and citizenship than they could
possibly accommodate were they to open their borders and that must
perforce be choosey. As it happens, Silmi is already a resident of France;
no one is proposing to separate her from her husband and children, and
31. See FADELA AMARA & SYLVIA ZAPPI, BREAKING THE SILENCE: FRENCH
WOMEN’S VOICES FROM THE GHETTO 24 (2006) (describing the motivations for and
activities of the movement).
32. See Silmi, supra note 24.
33. Id.
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perhaps, in time, the opportunity for greater exposure to the values of her
country of residence will lead her indeed to make those values her own.
IV. FEMINIST FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER
I happen to be contingently lucky that my own personal feminist
fundamentalist commitments are pretty close to those embodied by the
constitutional order under which I live, although I am just old enough to
have developed them as my personal commitments before the United States
Supreme Court enshrined them in constitutional jurisprudence.34 Through
a consistent line of Supreme Court cases over my lifetime, we in the United
States have developed an orthodoxy with respect to sex equality. Central to
this orthodoxy is that “fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
males and females” are anathema when embodied in law.35
Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, a latecomer to sex equality as a
constitutional priority and ordinarily an opponent of expanding federal
power over the states,36 reaffirmed in Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v.
Hibbs37 that we in the United States have so strong and well-established a
constitutional orthodoxy on matters of sex and gender—an orthodoxy, not
simply of sex equality, but of no governmentally endorsed sex-role
differentiation in all matters, including those related to family and childrearing—that Congress has prophylactic Section Five power to enforce it
on the states. Thus, to fight the long-standing, now heretical, “pervasive
sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women’s work,”38
Rehnquist held that Congress can impose on the states as employers the
Family and Medical Leave Act, which allows persons of both sexes to get
leave for what Martha Fineman39 would call their inevitable or derivative
34. See Mary Anne Case, No Male or Female, but All are One, in TRANSCENDING

BOUNDARIES OF THE LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 83
(Martha Fineman ed., 2011) (describing the development of the author’s feminist
jurisprudential commitments).
35. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982). For an
explication of the development of this orthodoxy, see Mary Anne Case, ‘The Very
Stereotype the Law Condemns’: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for
Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1473 (2000).
36. For a discussion of the evolution of Rehnquist’s views on sex equality, see
Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier Between Government and
Family Responsibility for Children, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 381, 388-89 (2009) [hereinafter
Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier].
37. 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003).
38. Id. at 731.
39. See generally MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 8 (Routledge, 1995) (defining
inevitable dependency as “the status of need for caretaking embodied in the young,
many of the elderly and disabled, as well as the ill”).
THE
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dependency, i.e., for their own illness and that of close family members, as
well as for the care of their young children.
My use of religiously inflected terms such as orthodoxy, heresy, and
anathema in this context is deliberately intended to press a further analogy
to the discourses of religion: just as, for example, the new constitution of
Iraq provides that “No law that contradicts the established provisions of
Islam may be established,”40 so in the United States, no law that contradicts
the equality of the sexes may be established. It is this which causes me to
call sex equality a fundamentalist (in my sense of the term) and not just a
fundamental commitment of the United States constitutional order.
Together with racial equality and the non-establishment of religion, the
equality of the sexes is among the very few commitments the existing
United States constitutional order makes fundamentally binding on
government whenever it acts or speaks. This is an orthodoxy that it is
incumbent on government to follow-through on in all fields—in its
hortatory pronouncements, in its funding decisions, and in its necessary
interventions into the family and the private sphere, such as its custody and
adoption decisions. Thus, while government as speaker and dispenser of
subsidies is free to take a variety of positions, among the positions it may
now no longer take nor promote is, for example, the position of Justice
Bradley in Bradwell v. Illinois that “[t]he natural and proper timidity and
delicacy which belong to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life . . . [,]”41 notwithstanding that such a position may
still be fervently held by many people of faith. Moreover, government as
decision maker must also act consistently with its commitment to sex
equality.
What might this mean in practice? Consider a few examples, some more
hypothetical than others. First, at one extreme of the hortatory axis, what
constitutional limits might there be on mere government pronouncements
of principle unmoored from direct, binding connection to policy? In 1993,
the commissioners of Cobb County, Georgia adopted resolutions
proclaiming, inter alia, “that ‘the traditional family structure’ is in accord
with community standards, . . . that ‘lifestyles advocated by the gay
community’ are incompatible with those standards . . . and that Cobb
County would not fund ‘activities which seek to contravene these existing
community standards.’”42
If by “traditional family structure” the
commissioners had explicitly indicated that they meant, not just a
heterosexual couple, but a patriarchal one, with wives submissive to
40. IRAQ CONST. § I, art. 2, First, A.
41. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1892) (Bradley, J., concurring).
42. See Joel Achenbach, A Report from the Front Line of the “Culture War,”

WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1993, at G1.
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husbands and confined to the domestic sphere as Justice Bradley urged, the
resolution would violate existing U.S. constitutional equality norms.
“Lifestyles advocated by the [feminist] community” can no longer be
“incompatible with the” official community standards of any unit of
government in the United States.43 “Welcome to Cobb County, Where a
Woman’s Place is in the Home” would be a combination welcome mat/no
trespassing sign with serious constitutional problems.
The problems only intensify when government seeks to use its powers to
fund or regulate to promote such a problematic message. Attention to such
problems is particularly urgent at times such as the present, when the
federal government is increasingly interested in sending messages about
appropriate family structure and sexual behavior backed by carrots and
sticks. For example, assuming arguendo that “promoting marriage”
through subsidies as well as hortatory and regulatory means is an
appropriate activity for the federal government, it is still constitutionally
constrained to promote only egalitarian marriage.
Justice Souter, in dissent from his colleagues’ decision upholding a
program of government funded vouchers parents could use to pay for
religious schools, wrote that not “every secular taxpayer [will] be content
to support Muslim views on differential treatment of the sexes, or, for that
matter, to fund the espousal of a wife’s obligation of obedience to her
husband, presumably taught in any schools adopting the articles of faith of
the Southern Baptist Convention.”44 I would go a step further than Souter
did and say that it would already be unconstitutional for the government to
fund this sort of teaching, in the same way as it has been held
unconstitutional for the government to fund racial segregation.
Implicated as well are limits on the messages state-sponsored schools
can offer—today such schools are required to refrain from promoting a
message of inequality between men and women. Unfortunately, when one
moves beyond those institutions bound directly by the Constitution or by
Title IX, there has to date been comparatively little in the way of regulatory
attention paid in the United States to ensuring that the education provided
to students through state-regulated private and home schooling even
minimally communicates or comports with norms of sex equality.
What it might mean in practice for sex equality norms to operate as a
43. See Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier, supra note 36, at 391;
Achenbach, supra note 42, at G1.
44. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 716 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (voicing concerns that “[r]eligious teaching at taxpayer expense simply
cannot be cordoned from taxpayer politics, and every major religion currently espouses
social positions that provoke intense opposition”); see REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON
BAPTIST FAITH AND MESSAGE, supra note 2 (“A wife is to submit herself graciously to
the servant leadership of her husband . . . .”).
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necessary constraint on state action is particularly tricky when that state
action involves children.45 But, as has been clear for some time when it
comes to state laws governing matters such as alimony and child support,
sex equality norms also should constrain government on those occasions
when it necessarily adjudicates concerning the family. For example, the
state should no more select as appropriate adoptive parents for a girl those
who believe and will teach their children that females are inferior to and
ought to be subservient to males than it would select for a black child
adoptive parents who believe non-whites are inferior to and should be
subservient to whites. That such beliefs are sometimes justified with
reference to religious faith should not immunize them from scrutiny. And
evidence of commitment to sex equality should be at least as assiduously
enquired into and at least as positively weighted as a prospective adoptive
or custodial parent’s commitment to providing a child with religious
training, something many decision-makers in adoption and custody cases
seem to enquire into and weigh favorably, often without much apparent
attention to the substance of the religious beliefs.
As things now seem to stand, however, when repressive religious beliefs
are pitted against secular feminist ones, the religious beliefs often begin
with a presumption to respect I want to insist is even more deserved, but I
realize is often not granted, to the feminist ones. Even courts that do, in the
end, rule against parents who claim religious authority for the sexist beliefs
and practices those parents seek to impose on their children often do so
without giving any explicit consideration to the role constitutional norms of
sex equality should play in their decision-making. For example, a Virginia
judge did terminate a father’s visitation with his son and daughter after
hearing (a) testimony by a clinical psychologist that the daughter “is
particularly at risk of psychological damage because of [her father’s]
telling her that women should not strive to accomplish what men
accomplish and that they are supposed to be subservient to men;” (b)
evidence that the daughter, an “excellent student,” did “better in school this
academic year, during which no visitation has occurred, than she did last
academic year, when there was visitation;” and (c) evidence that the father
had told both children that they and their mother, whom he called “a
sinner” and “of the devil,” would all go to hell.46 The judge concluded that
visitation with the father was causing “serious psychological and emotional
damage to the children” in no small part because “the values being taught
45. See generally Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism and the Baby
Markets, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY, MORALS AND THE NEOPOLITICS OF CHOICE
(Michele Goodwin ed., 2010); Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier, supra
note 36 (discussing issues such as education, child custody, and adoption).
46. Roberts v. Roberts, No. HI-471-4, 2002 WL725513, at *2, *7-9 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Apr. 15, 2002).
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to the children by [their father] are different from the values being taught to
the children by [their mother].”47 Among these conflicting sets of values
were that the mother “encourages the children to be whatever they want to
be. [The father] tells [his daughter] women cannot do what men do.”48
But, even with respect to these values, the judge insisted only that,
“[w]hichever set of values is right, and the court makes no judgment on
which set of values is right, they are irreconcilably at odds.” It may well be
true that, as between “tolerance” and “fire and brimstone”—another of the
enumerated conflicts in values between these parents—a court can make no
judgment, but I would argue that a court is constitutionally compelled to
choose encouragement of a daughter’s unrestricted choice of occupation
over a fixed and subordinating message that “women should not strive to
accomplish what men accomplish and . . . are supposed to be subservient to
men.”49 That is not to say that the parent who most favors sex equality
should always prevail, simply that a court must not remain viewpoint
neutral as between sex equality and its opposite; it must put a thumb on the
scales in favor of the parent who would give a daughter the same
encouragement, liberty, and opportunity as a son.
Before readers protest that I am proposing massive government
intervention into constitutionally protected family choices, they should
recall that I am focusing my attention here on situations where there is
already, of necessity, governmental intervention, such as necessary
government adjudication of custody disputes between two recognized
parents in the best interests of the child. Although difficult and
controversial borderline questions will arise, to limit analysis of what
Kathleen Sullivan has called “[c]onstitutional immunity for a private sphere
[that] fosters normative pluralism” 50 to adult women’s choices—including
the choice to accept sex-role differentiation or even subordination to men—
rather than attending as well to the choices imposed on young girls, tends
to oversimplify the divide between private and state action, and to
underestimate the United States’ constitutional obligation to carry through
on its own fundamentalist commitment to sex equality, even as it stops
short of perfectionism when it comes to opposing the choices consenting
adult women may make to accept traditional sex-roles or their own
subordination to the men in their lives.

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *8-9.
See Kathleen Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 735, 755 (2002) (analyzing the distinction between private and state action as it
concerns constitutional protection for women’s equality).
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V. DEFENDING AN INTEGRATIONIST VISION OF SEX EQUALITY
Unfortunately, the fundamental U.S. commitment to an integrationist
vision of the sexes may already be under threat even in the public sphere
and more fragile than it appears from a reading of the canonical case law.
Part of the reason is the change in personnel on the current Supreme Court.
Replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist with Roberts was, I think, a real loss for
sex equality; the replacement of Justice O’Connor with Justice Alito was
more generally conceded to be such. The Bush Administration, in addition
to supporting federal government funding of sex-education that reinforces
conventional gender roles,51 publicized guidelines saying that public
schools can have single-sex components, not even separate but equal, but
just separate.52 And, in recent state constitutional same-sex marriage
decisions, there is the threat of reintroduction of a concept of stateapproved sex-roles, as I will discuss further below.53 This is particularly
troubling for one with my feminist fundamentalist commitments.
In much of Western Europe, different, but in my view quite serious,
threats to an integrationist vision of sex equality are presented, inter alia, by
the demands of some Muslims for governmental accommodation of their
desire to separate the sexes physically as well as in their roles and
behaviors. I do not want to suggest that veiling or that physical segregation
of the sexes is per se incompatible with the equality of the sexes.
Indeed, in earlier work, I argued that:
among the important questions posed by a serious and detailed inquiry
into the comparative constitutionalism of women’s equality (one,
presented, if not squarely in the Afghan case, in other Islamic countries)
is how possible it might be to imagine a satisfactory constitutionalism of
equality in separate spheres. Can one imagine, for example, workable
constitutional guarantees of women’s learning, exercising, working,
competing, speaking, trading, politicking, and governing in a world of
women parallel to and equal with the world of men, with women doctors
treating women patients, women spectators cheering on women athletes,
and women judges deciding women’s cases? This would be a radically
different form of separate spheres than that familiar to us (and thus far
rejected by our constitutional law), which tends to feature men and
51. See, e.g., Joanna Grossman, The Bush Administration’s Push for Single-Sex
Education: An Attempt to Erode Federal Gender Equality Guarantees?, FINDLAW
(June 11, 2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20020611.html (raising
concerns about the Office of Civil Rights’ intention to “amend relevant law to take a
more ‘flexible’ approach to regulation of single-sex educational programs”).
52. Id.
53. See Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage
Litigation, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1199 (2010) [hereinafter Case, Same-Sex Marriage
Litigation] (analyzing same-sex marriage decisions and arguing that “recognition of
same-sex marriage and elimination of enforced sex roles are inextricably” linked).
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women in complementary roles rather than in parallel universes.54

However, I see no way around the conclusion that both veiling and sex
segregation may be incompatible with certain instantiations of sex equality
norms. For example, I can see no way around the conclusion that
segregation, separate spheres, and fixed sex-roles simply cannot be made
compatible with integration and a lack of “fixed notions.” Moreover, a
“mélange,” as Jeremy Waldron would call it, of the two, may be deeply
unsatisfying to both integrationists and separationists,55 even assuming
arguendo that it were practically sustainable. It may be easier to see in the
case of the Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”)56 or Saudi Arabia why one
woman or one scantily clad woman could destroy the system, but I also see
the risk of the one woman in a niqab or one public sex-segregated, roledifferentiated institutional space like VMI for a “no fixed notions” society
or an integrationist one. One might argue in response that categorical
opposition to veiling itself is an impermissible “fixed notion.” That seems
to be the line taken by German Constitutional Court Judge Bertold
Summer, author of the majority opinion in the Ludin case, who stressed
that a teacher in a veil could open up to her students the liberatory
possibility of full participation by devout Muslim women in public life.57
But, especially in a world in which modesty norms are not imposed equally
on both sexes, veiling does seem itself to embody a fixed notion about
women’s place and behavior, as well as of sexual difference and arguably
of sexual subordination, as the German dissenters and the Judges of the
European Court of Human Rights observed.58
Like the dissenters in the German veil case, I also do not mean to
essentialize the veil, nor to take any position at all as to what the veil means
to its wearers, but to stress that the question presented when representatives
of the state in their representative capacity wish to wear it is about what the
54. Mary Anne Case, Reflections on Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 765, 774-75 (2002) (commenting on Kathleen Sullivan’s
Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality and offering a different analysis of the history of
the constitutionalization of women’s equality).
55. See Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy, Authority, and Freedom—Part 1: “Autonomy
and
Culture,”
Princeton
University
Podcasts
Oct.
20,
2006,
http://coblitz.codeen.org:3125/www.princeton.edu/WebMedia/podcast/20061020raz_pt
1.mp3 (referring to modern multicultural circumstances in which there are “remnants of
various cultures living side by side” and the individual has to “find footing” in both the
traditional and modern cultures). I see at the heart of this problem the paradox of
diversity—both a variety of uniformity and a uniformity of variety deny diversity as
much as they affirm it. See Mary Anne Case, Community Standards and the Margin of
Appreciation, 25 HUM. RTS. L.J. 10 (2005).
56. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (mandating the
admission of women to previously all-male state-sponsored military academy).
57. Judge Bertold Summer, Remarks Following Presentation on the Ludin Case at
Freie Universitaet Berlin (May 26, 2004). See Ludin, supra note 5.
58. See, e.g., Ludin, supra note 5, dissenting opinion.
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veil reasonably can be interpreted to mean by people both within and
without the Muslim community who must deal with the state through this
representative.
Consider an American analogy: I accept that the
Confederate flag, to some of the people who display it, is not meant as
statement of racism or white supremacy, or anything of the kind, but just a
statement of heritage. I nevertheless would think it reasonable if
governments in the former Confederacy disavowed that flag as a symbol of
their state and prevented civil servants from wearing it on duty or
displaying it at their desks, because one might reasonably interpret it as
having among its possible meanings a view about slavery, white
supremacy, or nostalgia for pre-Civil War or pre-Brown race relations
inconsistent with the fundamental commitments of the government these
civil servants serve. The analogy is, I admit, imperfect for many reasons,
not least of which is that no one that I know of claims to be under a
fundamentalist compulsion to display the Confederate flag.
Veiling may get the bulk of the attention in Europe to date, but, more
worrisomely, it often functions as a combination stalking horse and Trojan
horse for the far more serious threat that other attempts to use the legal
order to re-impose sex roles and separate spheres are to the fragile
integration and equality in liberty of the sexes in Europe. These include,
for example, demands to excuse schoolgirls from everything from swim
class to field trips to contact with boys; to create public sex-segregated
spaces for adult males and females; to excuse adult men from physical
contact with female business colleagues; and to limit professionals such as
physicians and nurses from serving both sexes.59
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg may have had a similar creeping danger in
mind when, responding in United States v. Virginia to claims that one
public university from which women were excluded did not threaten the
Constitutional guarantee of equal protection by sex, she observed:
Thomas Jefferson stated the view prevailing when the Constitution was
new: “Were our State a pure democracy . . . there would yet be excluded
from their deliberations . . . [w]omen, who, to prevent depravation of
morals and ambiguity of issue, could not mix promiscuously in the
public meetings of men.” 60

Because I am so committed to, and so alive to the fragility of, an
59. See, e.g., Ian Johnson, A Course in Islamology: Everyday Dilemmas of Muslim
Life in Berlin, THE BERLIN JOURNAL, Fall 2005, at 46, 47 (“[W]omen may not take
overnight trips without a male blood relative accompanying them.”); Sylvia Poggioli,
In Europe, Muslim Women Face Multiple Issues, NPR (Jan. 20, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18234876&ft=1&f=1004
(exploring the differing views and challenges of Muslim women in Western society).
60. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 n.5 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Samuel Kercheval (Sept. 5, 1816), in 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 45-46, n. 1
(P. Ford ed., 1899)).
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integrationist vision of the sexes, I am in sympathy with efforts by
European countries to put the brakes on the possibilities for reintroduction
of norms of sex-segregation and sex-role differentiation. Like the Muslim
governors and head of Begum’s British school, and legislators and school
officials in France and Turkey, as well as a substantial percentage of their
constituencies, Muslim and non-Muslim, I fear that accommodation of
demands by some Muslims for more sex-segregation or dress and role
differentiation of girls and women will only increase, perhaps to breaking
point, the pressure on other Muslim girls and women to conform to such
restrictions. In this regard, I think it has not been stressed enough that a
majority of French Muslims supported the ban on headscarves in French
public schools;61 that the overwhelming majority of Turks, at all times
since a ban on headscarves first was imposed by the Turkish constitutional
order, are Muslims;62 and that not only the school’s Muslim head and
Muslim majority Board of Governors, but Muslim fellow-students of
Begum, supported her school’s ban on jilbabs.63 In short, it would be
wrong to see the hijab debates as simply pitting secular Western
fundamentalist opponents of the veil against Muslims. I also understand the
real danger that oppression makes any faith grow stronger, that there is a
risk that women and girls will wear or feel compelled to wear the veil much
more when it is forbidden. However, this is a practical problem dependent
on specific circumstance, as to which I am willing to take local assessments
of comparative risk quite seriously, in accord with the margin of
appreciation.
While I see many practical problems with recent attempts by Britain and
Baden-Wuerttemberg to introduce examinations to ensure that immigrants
understand and accept, inter alia, local constitutional and cultural norms of
sex equality,64 I do not find it objectionable in theory for a polity to take
steps to ensure that those who wish to enter it as citizens or permanent
residents not only agree to abide by, but also truly accept, its fundamental
values. As noted above, a liberal culture should be at least as free as a
traditional one to defend and preserve its core values by exclusion from its
territory and regulation within its territory of those who threaten its
61. See, e.g., DOMINICK MCGOLDRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGION: THE
ISLAMIC HEADSCARF DEBATE IN EUROPE 99 (2006) (“Opinion polls suggested that the
ban was supported by . . . a small majority of Muslims.”).
62. See id., at 132.
63. See Begum, supra note 5.
64. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fleishman, German Muslims Object to Citizenship Tests on
Political, Religious Issues, N.Y. SUN, Apr. 13, 2006, available at
http://www.nysun.com/foreign/german-muslims-object-to-citizenship-tests/30903/
(“Baden-Wuerttemberg requires an education course and a 30-question oral test to
determine whether an immigrant supports issues such as women’s rights and religious
diversity. The test is graded at the discretion of the interviewer.”).
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fundamental commitments.
Just as I do in U.S. debates around issues for which participants on one
side use the connection of their position with their religious faith to claim
not only authority for their position but also a righteous sense of grievance
when challenged, I want to vindicate those, such as Tony Blair and Jack
Straw in Britain,65 who are not silenced in their articulation of disapproval
by an unjustified demand for polite deference on the part of their religious
opponents.
I am quite alive to the analogies between the arguments I am making
here and those made by opponents of legal recognition of same-sex
marriage and other legal protections for gay men and lesbians. There are
many reasons, however, why I do not think I can fairly be taxed with a
charge of inconsistency in my approach to these issues. Let me just
mention what is perhaps the most controversial of these reasons here: one
thing the most virulent of the opponents of same-sex civil marriage and I
agree on is that, in the end, compromise or a cuius regio eius religio
solution on these issues in the United States is not possible and a permanent
state of tolerance as opposed to endorsement by government of one side or
the other will be very difficult, although perhaps not as difficult as
maintaining the nation half slave and half free.66 The discussion above
about necessary state intervention concerning children suggests some of the
reasons why. In particular, there will be conflict and a resulting need to
take sides so long as public schools do any education at all that in any way
concerns matters such as the structures of family life—and even with a
radical revision of public education, this might not be possible to
eliminate.
I want now to move very briefly to considering some individuals whose
feminist fundamentalist commitments ought to be, I think, more recognized
in the American legal order. Let me discuss further below heterosexual
marriage resisters; Darlene Jespersen, whose commitment not to wear
makeup was disrespected by a majority en banc of the Ninth Circuit;67 and
Col. Martha McSally, who engaged in a multi-year campaign ending in
65. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Blair Criticizes Full Islamic Veils as “Mark of
Separation,” N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006, at A3 (joining the debate about veil wearing,
Blair backed House of Commons leader, Straw, claiming the practice “makes other
people from outside the community feel uncomfortable”).
66. Note, for purposes of this paper, I bracket the question of which side of the
current debates should be analogized to slavery and Jim Crow. My point here is about
the impracticalities of continued coexistence. It is not (at least not here and now) to
analogize gay and black civil rights. For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, A
Lot To Ask: Review Essay of Martha Nussbaum’s From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual
Orientation and Constitutional Law, 19 COLUM. J. OF GENDER & L. 89, 124 (2010).
67. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006)
(rejecting Title VII sex discrimination claim by employee whose employer required her
but prohibited her male co-workers to wear makeup).
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litigation followed by Congressional action against the U.S. military’s
requirement that she wear an abaya, the all-encompassing black cloak that
is the Saudi Arabian instantiation of hijab.
VI. FEMINIST FUNDAMENTALISM AS AN INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT
A. HETEROSEXUAL MARRIAGE RESISTERS
The ongoing U.S. debates concerning the extension of civil marriage to
same-sex couples bring together a number of different fundamentalist as
well as perfectionist perspectives, including a variety from within both the
gay rights and religious conservative movements. I have long been of the
view that one underrepresented and undervalued set of perspectives in
these debates was those of feminists, including those who resist marriage
from a feminist perspective.68 Among the big losers in the recent spate of
state court decisions concerning same-sex couples are heterosexual
feminist couples, whether living in a state like New York, whose high court
has now said that marriage is going to be reserved for them because of
traditional sex roles,69 or even, perhaps especially, those living in states
which have recognized the claims of gay and lesbian couples for
recognition, but allowed marriage to be (p)reserved—or at least the name
of “marriage” to be (p)reserved—for heterosexual couples “‘because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’”70 its traditions. The traditions of marriage,
including its legal traditions, are anything but free of “fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females,” also anything but
free of female subordination.71
68. For further discussion, see Case, Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, supra note 53,
at 1199.
69. See Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 359 (2006) (holding that a rational
basis for the exclusion of same sex couples from marriage could be the legislature’s
intuition “that a child benefits from having before his or her eyes, every day, living
models of what both a man and a woman are like”).
70. I take this language from Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)
(requiring discriminatory intent as well as disparate impact for claims of violation of
equal protection on grounds of sex).
71. This is not to say that civil marriage today need be a prisoner of its traditions—
only that, by explicitly seeking to limit it to heterosexual couples because of its
traditions, the law so imprisons it and the couples who enter it. As I have been arguing
since 1993, but for the lingering cloud of repressive history hanging over marriage, it
would be clear that marriage today provides far more license, and has the potential to
be far more flexible, liberatory, and egalitarian than most available alternatives, such as
most existing domestic partnership schemes or ascriptive schemes. See Mary Anne
Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of
Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1665-66 (1993) (“[i]t
seems to me that to the extent a case like Braschi can be read to discourage
experimentation with all less traditional ways for couples to organize their lives and
manifest their commitment to one another, it may be more oppressive for feminists,
whatever their sexual preference, than gay marriage would be for anyone”); Mary Anne
Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1787 (2004-05) [hereinafter Case,
Marriage Licenses] (describing the development of the laws of marriage so as to be

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss2/5

22

CASE 1/14/11

4/6/2011 7:27:45 PM

Case: Feminist Fumdamentalism as an Individual and Constitutional Commi

2011]

FEMINIST FUNDAMENTALISM

571

Only in a few states is marriage now open on the same terms to all
couples regardless of sex. In California, the state supreme court decision
opening marriage to same-sex couples (a result overturned by the passage
of Proposition 8, which in its turn was challenged in federal court)72 went
out of its way to reject the claim that sex discrimination was at issue in the
state’s prior exclusion of same-sex couples.73 Other states that offer some
formal legal recognition to same-sex couples have set up separate regimes
for them—denominated civil unions or domestic partnerships—and put
those regimes off-limits to the mine run of male-female couples.74 These
bifurcated regimes send a message of subordination to both gays and
lesbians on the one hand and heterosexual women on the other, while
reaffirming patriarchy.
Withholding from same-sex couples the
opportunity to marry devalues their unions both symbolically and
practically, while restricting marriage to male-female couples and malefemale couples to marriage forces women who wish to unite themselves to
men under state law to do so in an institution whose all too recent legal
history is one of subordinating wives both practically and symbolically, an
institution reserved for them alone because of and not in spite of its
“traditional” (i.e., patriarchal) significance. While civil union or domestic
partnership may have gone a long way toward constitutionalizing the
equality of gay men and lesbians in the states that offer it to them,, it was,
in my view, a step backward for constitutionalizing the equality of straight
women in states that did not also open it on equal terms to male-female
couples.
Note that, if states had opened either marriage to same-sex couples or
civil unions to male-female couples, I myself, unlike some other feminist
fundamentalists, would not be complaining about an affront to women’s
equality: If marriage were opened to all couples, it could continue its
development away from its patriarchal past rather than be preserved in the
tradition of that past, and if civil union were open to all couples, women
who wished to receive state recognition of their union with a man, together
with the associated bundle of legal benefits, could do so without being
forced to submit to entry into a form of union that traditionally has
increasingly less constraining).
72. See generally Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(striking down the results of Proposition 8 as violative of the federal constitutional
guarantees of equal protection and due process).
73. See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 837 (2008) (holding that exclusion
of same-sex couples from marriage impermissibly discrimination on grounds of
orientation but not of sex).
74. See Case, Marriage Licenses, supra note 71, at 1775 (citing Vt. Stat. Ann. §
1204(a) (2004), 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts. No. 05-10) (offering the same benefits and
protections of marriage to same-sex couples in civil unions but denying the availability
of civil unions to heterosexual couples).
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subordinated them.
In some ways marriage is like the abaya in the McSally case, discussed
below: among other similarities, they both historically involve the
“covering” of women in circumstances where men are not similarly
covered: an abaya physically through its cumbersome enveloping folds;
marriage legally, through the encumbrance of coverture, which subsumed a
wife’s identity in her husband’s. Some women who voluntarily enter the
one or put on the other do so without feeling or intending to
“communicate . . . [a] belief that women are subservient to men.”75 Others
by such acts embrace and announce their adherence to such a belief, as is
their personal right. But a government committed to constitutionalizing
women’s equality in the way that U.S. law now demands should not
condition important privileges, including membership in the armed forces
and in a legally recognized union, on a woman’s willingness to accept
trappings whose social meaning she reasonably associates with a message
of subordination she (and this nation) rejects.
There have been heterosexual feminist fundamentalist marriage resisters,
male and female, in the Unites States for centuries. But they have never
gotten much respect from the law. In recent years, a wide variety of
challenges by them to benefits extended by employers and units of
government only to those unmarried couples whose members were of the
same sex have been met with the judicial response that because
heterosexual couples can legally marry, they suffer no impermissible
discrimination.76 No weight at all is given to their fundamentalist
objections to civil marriage. Moreover, a side-effect of recent successful
opposition to recognition of same-sex relationships, including the so-called
mini-DOMA or Defense of Marriage Acts, is that their ability to order their
relations by enforceable contract has suffered setbacks in many states.
B. DARLENE JESPERSEN
A standard gambit of proponents of veiling or of the right to veil of
Muslim women such as students and schoolteachers in Europe is to note
that the West also imposes what can be seen as role-differentiating,
subordinating attire on women, but instead of freeing them from sexual
threat and sexualization, such attire makes them sex objects; instead of
75. See Amended Complaint of Petitioner at ¶ 11, McSally v. Rumsfeld, 01-2481
(D.D.C. 2001) [hereinafter McSally Amended Complaint] (arguing that military
regulations requiring female personnel to wear an abaya when leaving the base in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia violated McSally’s constitutional rights to religious freedom
and equal protection on grounds of sex).
76. See, e.g., Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604, 610-11 (7th Cir. 2001)
(upholding exclusion of unmarried heterosexual couples from employee benefits
offered to married couples and same-sex domestic partners).
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covering them, it exposes them.77 From the time the Supreme Court
decided Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins78 in 1989 until very recently, I would
have claimed that, in accord with its and my feminist fundamentalist
commitments, the United States legal order offered women who wished to
resist the demand to “dress more femininely, wear make up, have [their]
hair styled, . . . wear jewelry” its strong support.79 In 2006, however, the
Ninth Circuit en banc decided that Darlene Jespersen could be fired after
two successful decades as a bartender for Harrah’s Casino simply because
she would not wear make-up.80 Jespersen’s account of her reasons for
refusing to do so sounds to me like a feminist fundamentalist parallel to the
cases of Muslim women who will not unveil, and a feminist fundamentalist
twin of the case of Col. McSally, who would not veil, discussed below. As
the majority that ruled against her summarized it:
Jespersen described the personal indignity she felt as a result of
attempting to comply with the makeup policy. Jespersen testified that
when she wore the makeup she “felt very degraded and very demeaned.”
In addition, Jespersen testified that “it prohibited [her] from doing [her]
job” because “[i]t affected [her] self-dignity . . . [and] took away [her]
credibility as an individual and as a person.81

Although the majority disrespected Jespersen’s commitments, describing
her as idiosyncratic and Harrah’s rules as neither rooted in sex stereotypes
nor posing an undue burden on women, dissenting Judge Kosinski
observed:
If you are used to wearing makeup—as most American women are—this
may seem like no big deal. But those of us not used to wearing makeup
would find a requirement that we do so highly intrusive. Imagine, for
example, a rule that all judges wear face powder, blush, mascara, and
77. I should note that my resistance to my own forced veiling extends to forced
imposition on me of Western garb reserved for females, especially that which, like the
abaya, hampers freedom of movement. Although warned by other lawyers that I might
be denied admission to the seating reserved for the Supreme Court bar for the oral
argument of the VMI case if I wore a pantsuit, I wore one, relishing the irony if the
case for which I were to be excluded was precisely that one, making sure the suit was
one a male would be admitted in, keeping a borrowed tie in my pocket so I could bring
my legal challenge cleanly if I had to, but also knowing that I’d have to wait hours
outside the Court in the freezing dawn before I could take my seat and that pants were
warmer than pantyhose, so something more practical than a taste for androgyny or nondiscrimination was at stake.
78. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that it
constituted impermissible sex discrimination for an accounting firm to suggest to a
female candidate for partnership that she “dress more femininely, wear make up, have
her hair styled, [and] wear jewelry”).
79. For an extended discussion of the Hopkins case and its implications, see
generally Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995).
80. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
81. Id. at 1108.
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lipstick while on the bench. Like Jespersen, I would find such a regime
burdensome and demeaning; it would interfere with my job performance. I
suspect many of my colleagues would feel the same way. Everyone
accepts this as a reasonable reaction from a man, but why should it be
different for a woman? It is not because of anatomical differences, such as
a requirement that women wear bathing suits that cover their breasts.
Women’s faces, just like those of men, can be perfectly presentable without
makeup; it is a cultural artifact that most women raised in the United States
learn to put on—and presumably enjoy wearing—cosmetics. But cultural
norms change; not so long ago a man wearing an earring was a gypsy, a
pirate or an oddity. Today, a man wearing body piercing jewelry is hardly
noticed. So, too, a large (and perhaps growing) number of women choose
to present themselves to the world without makeup. I see no justification
for forcing them to conform to Harrah’s quaint notion of what a “real
woman” looks like.82
C. MARTHA MCSALLY
While an U.S. Air Force fighter pilot stationed in Saudi Arabia, Colonel
Martha McSally brought a court challenge83 to regulations requiring all
female U.S. military personnel on all trips off base in Saudi Arabia to be
accompanied by a male companion and to wear an abaya, the full body
covering which is the Saudi Arabian instantiation of the Islamic
requirement of hijab. Before bringing suit, she had tried unsuccessfully but
vigorously for a number of years to get these regulations changed within
the military hierarchy.84 McSally’s complaint said these regulations
violated her constitutional rights for several reasons, among them by
forcing her as a Christian woman to portray herself as a Muslim in Muslim
garb and “by forcing her to communicate the coerced and false message
that she adheres to the belief that women are subservient to men, by
according her different treatment and status based solely upon her gender,
and by undermining her authority as an officer.”85
Her complaint made several things clear. First, these requirements were
imposed by the U.S. military, not by Saudi law. Other female U.S.
government personnel, such as State Department employees, were not
required or encouraged to nor did they abide by them; rather they complied
with Saudi veiling requirements by donning only a headscarf. Second,
male U.S. military personnel were not only not required, they were
82. Id. at 1117–18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
83. McSally Amended Complaint, supra note 75.
84. Id. ¶¶ 5, 23-25 (“The plaintiff in this case, Lt. Col. Martha McSally . . . has

protested the regulations through her chain of command, to no avail.”).
85. Id. ¶ 11.
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categorically prohibited, from wearing local dress. McSally gave practical
examples of how the rules undermined her authority, but also how the rules
were actually counterproductive to their intended purpose, given that the
local religious police, who might have left her in peace had she been lightly
veiled and obviously a Westerner, treated women in abayas as coming
more fully under their jurisdiction and hence eligible for punishment for
minor transgressions, such as letting the abaya slip.86
Of the people I am calling feminist fundamentalists I’ve listed in this last
portion of the paper, Martha McSally is the only one to have achieved
victory, but I think it is instructive to note how and why she won. She did
not win in the courts. Her case is also one of the Constitution outside the
courts. McSally won by a unanimous vote of the Congress, which directed
the United States military not to enforce or even suggest such a thing as
veiling to female military personnel in Saudi Arabia. During the
Congressional debate on the matter, as much attention was given to how
this poor Christian woman should not be forced to portray herself as a
Muslim as was given to her claim for equal protection on grounds of sex.
Focusing attention on McSally’s free exercise of religion claim is
interesting on several levels. First, it reveals a much broader and more
serious problem with the “heads we win, tails you lose” formulation which
so often works wonderfully well for Muslim fundamentalist proponents of
veiling, who simultaneously demand that Muslim women in the west be
fully accommodated in their desire to veil and be segregated and that nonMuslim women fully accommodate themselves to local norms of veiling
and sex-segregation in Muslim countries. The problem is this: either hijab
is a requirement only of Muslim women, in which case McSally is right
that imposing it on her forces on her the false claim that she is a Muslim, or
it is seen as a requirement of women generally, in which case its
proponents are making a claim that is far more universalist and
perfectionist than any typically made by their feminist opponents, and one
that it is therefore perfectly appropriate, indeed necessary, for these
opponents to resist vigorously.
Secondly, it is important to be clear that, judging by her subsequent
conduct, the sex equality claim was at least as important to McSally herself
as the free exercise claim. McSally was subsequently promoted, unusually
for a resister to military policy, to a position no female before her had held
and showed up for the inauguration ceremony in the male version of the
Air Force cap, even though to wear the male cap had been forbidden to
women.87 She subsequently published a law review article making clear
86. Cf. id. ¶ 27.
87. Carol Ann Alaimo, Aviator’s Choice of Headgear Causes a Stir Within Air

Force, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Aug. 24, 2004), http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-
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that her choice of cap was no accident, but a continuation of her struggle to
eliminate all unnecessary distinctions between male and female soldiers,
especially, but not exclusively, those that “demean or degrade
servicewomen.”88 So it seems that she took her feminist fundamentalist
claim at least as seriously as her free exercise claim, and I hope the time
soon comes when it is perfectly clear that the American legal system does
as well.

1G1-121173890/tucson-ariz-aviator-choice.html.
88. Martha McSally, Women in Combat: Is the Current Policy Obsolete?, 14 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1011, 1037 (2007) (arguing that the Department of Defense
must eliminate double standards which are “demeaning or patronizing to women”).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss2/5

28

